I'LL CALL THE SECOND CASE.
COLGROVE VS. THE STATE OF
MINNESOTA.
>> COUP SELL, YOU EACH HAVE
THREE MINUTES OF TIME
UNINTERRUPTED AT THE BEGINNING
AND AT THE 3 MINUTE MARK I'LL
INTERRUPT YOU AND SEE IF MEMBERS
OF THE COURT HAVE QUESTIONS.
MS. WORKMAN, LOOKS LIKE YOU
RESERVED FIVE MINUTES FOR
REBUTTAL AND YOU MAY PROCEED
WHEN YOU'RE READY.
>> GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONORS,
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT AND
COUNSEL.
MY NAME IS MS. WORKMAN AND I'M
AN ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER AND
REPRESENT CHRISTOPHER COLGROVE,
THE APPELLANT.
THE CASE BEFORE YOU TODAY IS
UNDOUBTEDLY A TRAGIC ONE AND
THERE'S NO DISPUTE THAT
MR. COLGROVE CAUSED THE VICTIM'S
DEATH.
THE CENTRAL QUESTION HERE IS
WHAT LEVEL OF MURDER DID THE
STATE'S EVIDENCE PROVE.
THERE'S TWO REASONS WHY THE
STATE'S EVIDENCE ONLY SUPPORTS
AN UNINTENTIONAL MURDER
CONVICTION.
FIRST IT IS REASONABLE TO INFER
FROM THE CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED
THAT MR. COLGROVE'S DRUG USE
NEGATED THE RECK WE SAT OF
SPECIFIC INTENT FOR FIRST DEGREE
FELONY MURDER.
SECOND EVEN IF YOU REJECT THE
ARGUMENT THAT HIS VOLUNTARY
INTOXICATION NEGATED THE
SPECIFIC INTENT, THE INTENT TO
KILL IS NOT THE ONLY RATIONAL
INFERENCE HERE AND DID NOT
ELIMINATE THE REASONABLE
POSSIBILITY THAT MR. COLGROVE
ACTED WITH THE INTEND TO COMMIT
AN ASSAULT NOT TO KILL.
IN LIGHT OF THE COPIOUS,
UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE POINTING
TO LACK OF INTENT TO KILL, WE'RE
ASKING THIS COURT TO REVERSE AND
KAY INDICATE HIS CONVICTION FOR
FIRST DEGREE FELONY MURDER AND
IMPOSE AN UNINTENTIONAL MURDER
CHARGE IN COUNT THREE.
YOUR HONORS, I WOULD LIKE TO
START WITH THE VOLUNTARY
INTOXICATION ISSUE WITH REGARDS
TO FIRST DEGREE FELONY MURDER,
BUT I'LL STOP AND ALLOW THE
COURT TO ASK ANY QUESTION IFS
YOU HAVE ANY AT THIS POINT.
>> COUNSEL, I WANT TO ASK YOU
ABOUT THE SECOND ARGUMENT THAT
YOU'RE MAKING WITH RESPECT TO
THE ASSAULT.
THE FIRST QUESTION I HAVE IS
JUST HELP ME UNDERSTAND THE
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND YOUR
CLIENT IS IN THE HOME AND
THERE'S A PHYSICAL STRUGGLE
BETWEEN YOUR CLIENT AND THE
VICTIM AND YOUR CLIENT LOCATES A
KNIFE.
>> IT'S UNCLEAR FROM THE RECORD
WHAT HAPPENS FIRST IS THE AND
IT'S TESTIFIED TO THE POLICE
OFFICER AND HE COMES IN MID
STRUGGLE.
>> APPARENTLY, YES.
THERE'S SUCH A SHORT PERIOD OF
TIME WHEN ALL THIS OCCURS.
AT SOME POINT HE DOES SEE IT AND
THAT'S SECONDS LATER AND HE MUST
HAVE ARMED HIMSELF AT SOME POINT
AND WE KNOW HE DID NOT BRING THE
KNIFE WITH HIM TO THE SCENE.
>> SO AS I UNDERSTANDS RECORD,
THERE'S A PHYSICAL STRUGGLE
GOING ON,S VICTIM PUSHES YOUR
CLIENT AWAY AND THEN AFTER THAT
YOUR CLIENT STABS THE VICTIM
TWICE.
>> YES, SIR, YOUR HONOR.
>> AND IN -- YES, YOUR HONOR.
>> ONE OF THE STAB WOUNDS GOES
SO DEEPLY INTO HER LOWER BACK IT
GOES SOME 5 INCHES AND PIERCES I
GUESS FOUR DIFFERENT ORGANS.
THEN THERE'S A STAB WOUND IN THE
NECK.
SO IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT
THERE'S A PHYSICAL STRUGGLE, THE
VICTIM PUSHES HIM AWAY AND THEN
YOUR CLIENT STABS THE VICTIM SO
BRUTALLY, HOW IS IT REASONABLE
TO INFER THAT THERE WAS NOT
INTENT TO KILL HERE?
>> THERE ARE MANY SIXER THAT
THIS COURT NEEDS --
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THIS COURT
NEEDS TO LOOK AT THERE'S NOT
INTENT TO KILL AND I'LL SAY
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE QUITE
UNIQUE AND YOUR HONORS HAVE
NEVER SEEN A CASE LIKE THIS
BEFORE.
SO THE CASE LAW THAT WE LOOK TO
HERE WHILE IT IS HELPFUL, IT IS
NOT DIRECTLY ON POINT AS TO BOTH
ISSUES AS TO THE INTENT TO
COMMIT AN ASSAULT AND INTENT TO
KILL.
THAT'S BECAUSE OF YET AGAIN THE
UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES HERE.
WHAT I WILL POINT OUT TO YOU,
YOUR HONOR, IS THE NUMBER OF
STAB WOUNDS TO BE VERY QUICK OF
A TIME PERIOD THIS HAPPENED AND
LACK OF MOTIVE AND STATEMENT
FROM MY CLIENT SAYING, I'M GOING
TO KILL YOU KNOW THAT YOU PUSHED
ME OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT.
WE HAVE A CHAOTIC SITUATION AND
EVERYONE AGREES MR. COLGROVE IS
VERY HIGH ON DRUGS AND DOES NOT
KNOW WHAT'S GOING ON AND IS
TRYING TO FLEE BECAUSE OF A
CONSPIRACY PAIR KNOW PAR OWE YAA
FAKE COP AND HE'S TRYING TO GET
OUT THE DOOR.
WHY THAT TURNS INTO STABBING
SOMEONE, THAT ONLY MR. COLGROVE
KNOWS THAT IN THAT INSTANCE.
PAIRNOIA HE'S TRYING TO HARM HER
IN ORDER TO GET AWAY.
IT IS NOT THAT HE IS TRYING TO
KILL HER.
IT IS NOT THAT HE HAS SOME
REASON TO KILL HER.
HE IS TRYING TO GET AWAY BECAUSE
OF HIS PAIR YOU YA.
>> COUNSEL -- PARANOIA.
>> COUNSEL, MY UNDERSTANDING IS
THAT THE DOOR WAS UNLOCKED AND
THAT WAS THE HABIT OF THE VICTIM
AND HER FAMILY THEY'D LEAVE THE
DOORS UNLOCKED TILL THE EVENING
TIME.
>> THAT'S RIGHT.
>> BUT THE REASON THE OFFICER
HAS TO BREAK THE DOOR DOWN IS
BECAUSE THE DOOR IS NOW LOCKED.
>> THAT'S RIGHT.
>> ISN'T THE INFERENCE THAT YOUR
CLIENT LOCKED THE DOOR AND IF
THAT'S TRUE, WHAT DOES THAT TELL
US ABOUT WHETHER HE INTENDED
WHETHER IT WAS PREMEDITATED OR
NOT?
>> WELL, TWO POINTS HERE.
FIRST, WE'RE NOT DEALING WITH
PREMEDITATION HERE BECAUSE THIS
IS NOT A FIRST DEGREE
PREMEDITATED MURDER.
THIS IS FIRST DEGREE FELONY
MURDER.
>> THANK YOU FOR THAT.
ABOUT HIS INTENT, WHEN YOU LOCK
THE DOOR.
>> RIGHT, I'LL GRANT THAT
PREMEDITATION -- THE CASE LAW
AROUND PREMEDITATION DOES SORT
OF BLEED OVER INTO INTENT HERE
AND IT GIVES US SORT OF A PATH
TO GO WITH ON WHAT SUSHES YOU
LOOK AT TO -- CIRCUMSTANCES YOU
LOOK AT TO SEE THE INTENT AND
ONE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED
HERE IS, YES, THE DOOR WAS
LOCKED.
WE DON'T KNOW WHO LOCKED THE
DOOR.
WHETHER THAT WAS THE VICTIM OR
MR. COLGROVE.
AGAIN, IT'S UNCLEAR.
LOTS OF WHAT HAPPENED INSIDE THE
HOUSE BEFORE THE OFFICER ARRIVED
IS UNCLEAR AND NOT PROVEN IN THE
RECORD.
>> WHY WOULD SHE LOCK THE DOOR?
ISN'T IT A LOGICAL INFERENCE
THAT HE DID?
>> EVEN IF HE DID, THAT GOES TO
PROVE HIS EXTREME PAIR KNOW PART
THIS TIME AND WORRIED ABOUT A
"FAKE COP"COMING TO GET HIM AND
IF HE'S LOCKING THE DOOR THAT
SHOWS HE'S SCARED AND HE'S
EXPERIENCING EXTREME PARANOIA
AND ERRATIC WEIRD BELIEFS GOING
ON BECAUSE OF DRUG USAGE.
>> COUNSEL, WHAT DO WE DO ABOUT
THE -- MAYBE THAT'S THE WRONG
WAY TO PHRASE THIS.
I'M PUZZLED BY THE FAILURE OF
THE DEFENSE TO ASK FOR THE
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
INSTRUCTION AND I'M JUST
WONDERING IF THE FACT THAT THAT
WASN'T ASKED FOR, YOU MADE
NUMEROUS REFERENCES TO HIS PAIR
PARANOID BELIEFS AND BEHAVIOR,
IN THE EVIDENCE OF THAT IN THE
INSTRUCTION, IS THAT EVIDENCE
RELEVANT AT ALL?
WHAT DOES THE RECORD TELL US
ABOUT THE REASON FOR NOT GETTING
THAT INSTRUCTION?
>> THE RECORD IS REPLETE WITH
THE REASON WHY THE DEFENSE
DIDN'T ASK FOR THAT INSTRUCTION.
THEY WENT THROUGH THE DISCUSSION
WITH THE JUDGE TWICE AT THE END
OF ONE TRIAL DAY AND AT THE
BEGINNING OF ANOTHER TRIAL DAY
WHERE THE STATE WAS ACTUALLY
REQUESTING THE INSTRUCTION AND
DEFENSE COUNSEL VERY PURPOSESLY
PUT ON THE RECORD -- PURPOSELY
PUT ON THE RECORD WHY THEY
DIDN'T WANT THAT AND THAT'S ON
PAGES 1280 AND 1281 IF YOUR
HONORS WANT TO SEE THE SUMMATION
THERE AND THE DEFENSE COUNSEL CL
MADE IT CLEAR AND THEY DID NOT
WANT TO DEAL WITH THE EXTRA
BURDEN OF PRODUCTION THAT'S
ASSOCIATED WITH AN AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE.
THEIR ENTIRE CASE WAS ABOUT
INTENT.
IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN ABOUT INTENT.
IT WAS LITIGATED THAT WAY THEN
AND IT IS LITIGATE THAT HAD WAY
NOW.
LITIGATED THAT WAY NOW AND
THEIR DEFENSE WAS TO HAVE THE
JURY -- TO HOLOTHE STATE TO
ITS -- HOLD THE STATE TO ITS
BURDEN OF PROVING THE ELEMENT OF
DEFENSE AND HAVE THE JURY
DETERMINE IF THAT ALMOST WAS
PROVEN BY THE STATE.
THEY WANTED TO HOLD THE STATE TO
THAT BURDEN AND NOT TAKE ON AN
EXTRA BURDEN THEMSELVES.
AS YOUR HONORS KNOW, SUFFICIENT
OF THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT REQUIRE
A JURY INSTRUCTION FOR IT TO BE
RAISED.
SUFFICIENCY IS A COMMON ISSUE
THAT IS BROUGHT UP HERE.
EVEN THOUGH THIS WAS NOT
SOMETHING THAT THEY ASKED FOR IN
THE JURY INSTRUCTION, THIS ISSUE
COULD EASILY BE ARGUED BY THE --
SUFFICIENTLY ARGUED HOW IT IS
BEFORE THIS COURT TODAY.
>> COUNSEL, I WANTED TO ASK YOU
ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED
BECAUSE I BELIEVE IN YOUR BRIEF
YOU URGED US TO CONSIDER
MR. COLGROVE'S STATEMENT THAT HE
WOULD NEVER HURT ANYBODY.
BUT I THINK UNDER OUR CASE LAW,
IT'S PRETTY CLEAR THAT THAT
STATEMENT WOULD CONFLICT WITH
THE JURY'S VERDICT ON AT LEAST
TWO OF THE COUNTS SO WE DON'T
CONSIDER THAT AS ONE OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED.
>> I BELIEVE THE STATE IS USING
THAT STATEMENT, YOUR HONOR, THAT
HE KNEW WHAT HE WAS DOING AT THE
TIME.
THEY'RE SAYING THAT IS A
CIRCUMSTANCE PROVED AND WE'RE
SAYING, YES, IT IS A
CIRCUMSTANCE PROVED BUT IT
DOESN'T GO JUST FOR AN INFERENCE
OF INTENT TO KILL.
IT GOES FOR AN INFERENCE OF
PERHAPS INTENT TO COMMIT AN
INSULTIVE ACT BUT NOT INTENT TO
KILL.
BECAUSE THE STATE IS NOT
CHALLENGING WHETHER THAT WAS A
CIRCUMSTANCE PROVED, YOUR HONORS
CANNOT CONSIDER THAT.
LARDING THE VOLUNTARY
INTOXICATION, I WANT TO GO OVER
SOME OF THE FACTS HERE THAT MAKE
THIS CASE SO UNIQUE AND SO
DIFFERENT FROM ANY OTHER CASE
THIS COURT HAS CONSIDERED
BEFORE.
NOW, IN OTHER CASES SUCH AS HAID
CONTRADICTORY BRIEFS AND WHETHER
OR NOT THE DEFENDANT WAS TRULY
INTOXICATED AND HERE WE HAVE
CONTRADICTIVE EVIDENCE AND THAT
MAKES THIS CASE UNIQUE AND THE
VERY QUICK TIMING THAT DOESN'T
ALLOW FOR PURPOSEFUL
DELIBERATION HERE FOR SOMEONE TO
COME UP WITH INTENT.
THERE'S A LACK OF PLANNING.
THERE'S NO COMMUNICATION OF
INTENT.
>> SO FIRST OF ALL, -P EVEN
ASSUMING THAT HE WAS -- THAT MRM
DELUSIONS AND PARANOIA IN AND
OUT, THAT SEEMS CLOSER TO WHAT
THE RECORD INDICATES DURING THE
COURSE OF THE DAY, DOES THAT GO
TO WHETHER HE KNEW WHEN HE WAS
STABBING HE WAS ACTUALLY
STABBING A HUMAN HUMAN BEINGS?
ISN'T THAT REALLY THE QUESTION?
>> WE DON'T KNOW.
AGAIN, YOUR HONOR, BECAUSE --
>> BUT WHAT FROM THE RECORD
TELLS US -- HE KNEW THE OFFICER
WAS A HUMAN BEING BUT THOUGHT HE
WAS A FAKE OFFICER AND A FAKE
EMT BUT HE KNEW THEY WERE HUMAN
BEINGS.
ISN'T THAT INTENT TO KILL A
HUMAN BEING?
ISN'T THAT ALL WE NEED HER?
>> I DON'T BELIEVE IT WAS
NECESSARILY A HUMAN BEING.
IT WAS THE CONDUCT ITSELF WE
HAVE TO LOOK AT HERE.
WHETHER HE THOUGHT HIS CONDUCT
WAS -- WHETHER HE INTENDED HIS
CONDUCT TO KILL HER OR TO HARM
HER AND --
>> I'M SORRY TO INTERRUPT
BECAUSE IT'S THE CONFUSION ON
THOSE AND IT'S THE VOLUNTARY
INTOXICATION AND INTENT PERIOD
AND INTENT TO KILL AND CAN'T
FORM INTENT TO ASSAULT OR ARE
YOU.
WE SEEM TO BE CONFLATING THE TWO
A BIT.
>> I UNDERSTAND AND THEY DO
BLEND INTO OPEN OTHER AND IT'S A
LITTLE CONFUSING AND LET ME MAKE
MYSELF VERY CLEAR AND MY FIRST
ARGUMENT IS HE COULD NOT FORM
THE VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION AND
THE SECOND ARGUMENT IS REJECTING
THE VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION AND
MY SEGMENT ARGUMENT IS -- SECOND
ARGUMENT IS THAT IS NOT THE ONLY
INFERENCE HERE AND INTENT TO
KILL IS NOT THE ONLY INFERENCE
HERE AND THE SUSHES EQUALLY
PROVE --
>> I GET THAT AND PART IS COMING
TO RESPONSE TO JUSTICE
ANDERSON'S QUESTION ABOUT WHY
THE INSTRUCTION WASN'T ASKED FOR
BECAUSE YOU SEEM TO SEEMS LIKE
THERE'S AN ARGUMENT ON VOLUNTARY
INTOXICATION AND SEEMS HARD
BASED ON SUFFICIENCY TO GET
THERE BUT YOU'RE SAYING HIS
PARANOIA AND SOME OF THE
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION AND
DELUSIONS RYAN HIGGINS WHAT HAVE
YOU ALSO GO TO THIS DISTINCTION
BETWEEN INTENT TO ASSAULT AND
KILL.
THEY SUPPORT DIFFERENT
REASONABLE INFERENCES AND THE
REASON THEY DIDN'T WANT TO TAKE
THAT QUESTION IS BECAUSE THEY
DIDN'T WANT TO MAKE THIS
ARGUMENT THERE WAS ALL THIS
STUFF GOING ON.
SO PART OF IT IS THAT ALL THOSE
FACTS ABOUT PARANOIA GO TO THE
SECOND ARGUMENT AS WELL?
>> I WOULD AGREE WITH THAT.
YOU CANNOT DIVORCE THE
CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED HERE FROM
EACH OF THE ARGUMENTS.
YOU DO HAVE TO CONSIDER THE FACT
THAT HE WAS VOLUNTARILY
INTOXICATED OR JUST CALL IT
INTOXICATION AT THAT POINT FOR
THE SECOND ARGUMENT.
>> TO WIN ON VOLUNTARY
INTOXICATION WHETHER THE
INSTRUCTION IS GIVEN OR NOT,
WHAT DO YOU -- OUR CASES ARE,
YOU KNOW, FRANKLY THEY'RE NOT
THE GREATEST OR CLEAREST IN THE
WORLD FROM MY PERSPECTIVE, BUT
WHAT DOES THAT MEAN THAT YOU'RE
SO INTOXICATED YOU CAN'T FORM AN
INTENT?
WHAT WOULD THAT LOOK LIKE?
>> WELL, IT LOOKS LIKE THE
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE WHERE
WE HAVE A DEFENDANT WHO EVERYONE
AGREES FROM THE EMT, THE COP,
HIS FAMILY MEMBERS, EVERYONE WHO
INTERACTS WITH HIM IN THE
MOMENTS BEFORE THIS HAPPENS,
THEY ALL AGREE THAT HE'S NOT IN
HIS RIGHT MIND.
YOU KNOW, THAT IF YOU LOOK AT
THE SPECIFIC QUOTES FROM HIS
SISTER THAT HE WASN'T ACTING
RIGHT AT ALL.
HE WAS COMPLETELY OUT OF IT.
THIS IS IN A NUTSHELL WHAT
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION LOOKS
LIKE.
>> BUT COULDN'T YOU BE OUT OF IT
BUT STILL BE ABLE TO -- YOU
COULD BE OUT OF IT LIKE YOU
DON'T KNOW THE REALITY OF WHO
THIS PERSON IS AND ALL THAT KIND
OF STUFF, BUT STILL FORM THE
INTENT TO KILL WHOEVER THAT
PERSON IS?
>> PERHAPS BUT NOT IN THIS CASE
BECAUSE THE COPIOUS EVIDENCE
HERE SHOWS THAT HE WAS SO NOT
REACTING TO REALITY THAT THE
STATE'S EVIDENCE FAILS TO PROVE
THAT HIS ACTIONS WERE WITH
INTENT.
THAT THE WAY THAT HE WAS ACTING
AND LOOKING AT HIS CONDUCT, IT
IS SO CLEAR HERE THAT HE DID NOT
KNOW WHAT HE WAS DOING.
>> COUNSEL, THE EVIDENCE YOU
JUST CITED IN RESPONSE TO
JUSTICE THISSEN'S QUESTION,
ISN'T ALL OF THAT EVIDENCE
INCONSIST WITH THE VERDICT AND
SO IN OUR STAN -- INCONSISTENT
TO THE VERDICT AND WE COULDN'T
CONSIDER THAT?
>> NO, YOUR HONOR, THE STATE
AGREES TO THE INTOXICATION
EVIDENCE.
THE STATE DID NOT OBJECT BELOW
OR NOW THAT HE WAS INTOXICATED
AND HIS SISTER SAW HIM IN THIS
STATE AND REMEMBER, THE SISTER
WAS A STATE WITNESS.
SHE WAS NOT A DEFENSE WITNESS IN
THIS CASE.
ALL OF THESE QUOTES THAT YOU SEE
FROM PEOPLE CAME FROM STATE
WITNESSES.
THIS WAS NOT A SITUATION WHERE
THERE WAS MINIMAL STATE
WITNESSES AND THEN THE DEFENSE
PUT ON A REALLY LONG CASE OF
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION.
ALL OF THE EVIDENCE CAME FROM
THE STATE ITSELF AND SO AGAIN
THAT'S WHAT DISTINGUISHES THIS
CASE FROM OTHER CASES WHERE THIS
COURT HAS DEALT WITH VOLUNTARY
INTOXICATION.
>> WHAT ABOUT ALL THE OTHER
EVIDENCE THAT SHOWS THAT HE WAS
MAKING DECISIONS AND ACTING IN A
WAY THAT SHOWED HE HAD THE
ABILITY TO CONTROL HIS BEHAVIOR.
HE CALLED 911 BECAUSE HE NEEDED
HELP AND PROVIDED HIS NAME AND
LOCATION.
HE FOLLOWED THE OFFICER'S
INSTRUCTIONS AT FIRST UNTIL THE
TASER MALFUNCTIONED.
YOU KNOW, HE WENT TO THE HOUSE,
FOUND THE KNIFE, LOCKED THE
DOOR.
I THINK THAT'S THE ONLY
REASONABLE INFERENCE IS THAT HE
LOCKED THE DOOR.
HE EVADED LAW ENFORCEMENT FOR
THE -- MOST OF THE NIGHT.
THOSE ARE THE THINGS THAT ARE
TOTALLY CONSIST WITH THE VERDICT
AND, YOU KNOW, WE LEAVE IT -- I
MEAN, OUR TWO STEP PROCESS IS WE
LOOK AT THE FACTS THAT ARE
CONSIST WITH THE JURY'S VERDICT.
I DON'T THINK IT MATTERS WHOSE
WITNESS IT IS.
>> NO, IT DOESN'T REALLY BUT I
SAY THAT TO REMIND THIS COURT
THAT THIS WAS THE STATE'S OWN
EVIDENCE THAT THEY PUT FORWARD.
TO YOUR POINT, JUSTICE CHUTICH,
THE STATE'S ARGUMENT AND
BASICALLY WHAT YOU ARE SUMMING
UP, AND THE STATE'S ARGUMENT IS
THEIR EVIDENCE MAKES ALL OF OUR
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
UNREASONABLE.
WELL, THIS EVIDENCE IS SO
BIZARRE THAT NOTHING HERE IS
UNREASONABLE.
I WILL SAY TO YOU THAT WHEN YOU
CONSIDER EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE
PROVED HERE, YOU CANNOT SAY THAT
THAT ELIMINATES COMPLETELY OTHER
REASONABLE INFERENCES THAT HE
DID NOT INTEND -- HE DID NOT
POSSESS THE INTENT TO KILL.
THAT HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS
GOING ON OR THAT HIS -- BY HIS
CONDUCT IT SHOWS THAT HE
INTENDED TO KILL THIS VICTIM.
>> SO EVEN IF HE LOCKED THE
DOOR, ASSUMING THAT'S THE ONLY
REASONABLE INFERENCE, SOMEONE
MIGHT LOCK THE DOOR BECAUSE THEY
WANT TO ASSAULT SOMEONE OR
BECAUSE THEY WANT TO KILL
SOMEONE AND EITHER WOULD BE
REASONABLE INFERENCES TO DRAW.
>> SOMEONE MIGHT LOCK THE DOOR
BECAUSE THEY'RE SCARED OF A FAKE
COP COMING AND NOTHING TO DO
WITH INTENT.
>> THAT'S REALLY THE QUESTION.
IT'S NOT DOES IT SUPPORT THE
REASONABLE INTEREST TO KILL BUT
IS THERE SOMETHING ELSE THAT
COULD BE CONSIST WITH IT?
>> THAT'S RIGHT.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES HERE SUPPORT
ONE INFERENCE OF INTENT TO KILL,
BUT THEY ALSO EQUALLY SUPPORT
OTHER INFERENCES AND BECAUSE THE
STATE'S EVIDENCE DOES NOT
ELIMINATE THOSE EQUAL
INFERENCES, YOUR HONORS CANNOT
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE RULE, YOUR HONORS
CANNOT SAY THAT THIS IS THE ONLY
INFERENCE THAT EXISTS AND
THEREFORE WE --
>> CAN I COME BACK TO ONE THING
YOU SAID.
THE STATE WASN'T OBJECTING HERE
TO THE FACT THAT HE WAS
SUFFERING FROM DELUSIONS, ET
CETERA.
THE WAY I READ THEIR BRIEF, THEY
ARE NOT ACCEPTING THAT AS A
CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED THOUGH?
>> THEY'RE NOT ACCEPTING -- THE
WAY I READ IT IS THAT THEY AGREE
THAT THERE WAS THIS EVIDENCE AND
THEY'RE TRYING TO KIND OF
DISTANCE THEMSELVES AWAY FROM
ALL THIS EVIDENCE OF DRUG USAGE
AND HIS BEHAVIOR, BUT THEY DO
NOT AGREE THAT HIS -- THAT THE
CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED DO NOT SHOW
AN INTENT TO KILL OR INTENT TO
HARM.
THEY BELIEVE THAT THE
CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED DO SHOW
THAT.
>> YOU'RE POSITION IS THAT ALL
THE EVIDENCE OF THE OFFICER
SAYING THAT HE DIDN'T RECOGNIZE
ME AS AN OFFICER AND EVIDENCE OF
EMT AND THE SISTER'S EVIDENCE,
YOUR POSITION IS THE STATE
AGREES THAT THOSE ARE
CIRCUMSTANCES PROVE THAT HAD WE
CAN CONSIDER?
>> YES, YOUR HONOR.
IT'S CLEAR FROM THE RECORD,
THERE'S NOTHING CONTRADICTED
HERE.
>> THAT MAY BE TRUE, WE'VE KIND
OF SAID TWO DIFFERENT THINGS IN
OUR CASE LAW.
WE'VE SAID IT HAS TO BE CONSIST
WITH THE VERDICT, THE FINDING OF
GUILTY AND THEN WE'VE ALSO SAID
IT HAS TO BE -- BUT IF THERE'S
NO INCONSIST -- IF EVIDENCE IS
NOT INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER
EVIDENCE, WE CAN CONSIDER THAT.
>> WE'VE SAID TWO DIFFERENT
THINGS.
YOUR POSITION IS WE SHOULD ADOPT
THAT AND IF THERE'S NOT
INCONSISTENCIES, WE CAN ADOPT
THAT?
>> THAT'S MY POSITION, YES.
>> MAYBE IT'S MORE FOR THE STATE
BUT IF WE CAN'T ASSUME
INFERENCES ARE CORRECT, OUR
WHOLE POINT ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE TEST IS WE DON'T I DID
FIR THE JURY ON -- DEFER THE
JURY IN INSTANCES AND WHAT DO WE
DO WHEN THE JURY REACHES A
VERDICT THAT'S BASED ON
INFERENCES.
I DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW THOSE TWO
THINGS FIT TOGETHER.
>> I UNDERSTAND THE POOL HERE,
YOUR HONOR, AND THE WAY THE
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS
WRITTEN AND IS NOT VERY HELPFUL
IN SOME STANCES BECAUSE IT
CHANGES FROM CASE TO CASE.
>> IS THERE SOMETHING ARBITRARY
ABOUT THAT?
>> IT FEELS A LITTLE ARBITRARY
AND FEELS LIKE A REAL EXERCISE
FROM THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
STANDARD AND I'LL SAY THIS CASE
IS CONSIST WITH WHAT YOU'RE
SAYING ABOUT NACIAR AND THERE'S
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE AND IT'S
NOT EVIDENCE FROM THE DEFENSE
WHERE IT WAS CLEARLY REJECTED BY
BY THE JURY AND I'M GETTING AT
HERE THAT IT'S THE STATE'S
EVIDENCE.
IT'S NOT SOMETHING THAT WAS
REJECTED.
GO AHEAD, YOUR HONORS.
>> SORRY TO INTERRUPT.
I WANT TO GO BACK TO THE
STANDARD BECAUSE WE LOOKED AT
THIS IN HARRIS VERY RECENTLY AND
WE WERE SPECIFICALLY ASKED TO
ABANDON THE TWO STEP PROCESS FOR
SOME OF THE SAME DIFFICULTIES
AND WE DECIDED NOT TO, AND WE
TALKED THERE ABOUT HOW WE
DISREGARD EVIDENCE THAT'S
INCONSIST WITH THE JURY'S
VERDICT.
THAT'S OUR LAST -- NOT OUR LAST
WORD ON IT BECAUSE WE HAVE THESE
CASES ALL THE TIME BUT SEEMS TO
MO THAT'S A PRETTY IMPORTANT
CASE.
>> THAT'S TRUE.
AND HARRIS AS WELL AS NASSIR AND
ALL THE CASE LAW THAT DEALT WITH
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CAN
STILL BE APPLIED HERE.
THE POINT IS IF YOU REJECT ANY
EVIDENCE HERE, THERE'S NO
EVIDENCE.
THE POINT IS THERE'S NOT A WHOLE
LOT OF EVIDENCE OTHER THAN WHAT
THE STATE ALREADY PRESENTED AND
THE EVIDENCE THEY DID PRESENT IS
HE WAS REALLY INTOXICATED.
HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS GOING
ON.
>> IN SOME SENSE OF WHAT WE
REJECTED IN HARRIS IS THE
ARGUMENT THAT WE ASSUME ALL THE
INFERENCES ARE CORRECT AND
CONSIST WITH THE VERDICT AND IN
SOME SENSE, WE REJECTED JUST
LOOKING AT WHETHER EVIDENCE IS
CONSIST WITH THE VERDICT IN
HARRIS BECAUSE THAT'S THE
UNITARY STANDARD.
>> I AGREE WITH THAT.
I ALSO THINK IT APPLIES MORE TO
CASES WHERE THE DEFENSE PUTS ON
EVIDENCE AND WE'RE LOOKING AT
WHETHER THE JURY BOUGHT THAT OR
WHETHER THEY DIDN'T.
WHETHER YOU CAN CONSIDER THOSE
FACTS THAT CAME OUT IN THE
DEFENSE CASE AS A CIRCUMSTANCE
PROVED.
>> THE HARDEST PONTOHERE FOR ME
IS SOME OF THE CHIEF ASKED
ABOUT.
HOW COULD A REASONABLE JURY
ASSUMING ALL THE FACTS, BUT HOW
COULD A REASONABLE JURY DECIDE
OR CONCLUDE THAT SOMEONE WHO
STABS SOMEONE 5 INCHES IN A
BACK, PUNCTURED FOUR ORGANS NOT
HAVE AN INTENT TO KILL?
>> BECAUSE IT GOES WITH THE
CONDUCT TO CAUSE GREAT BODILY
HARM AND IS KIN WITH ASSAULT AND
NOT INTENT TO KILL.
CAN COULD BE BOTH BUT BECAUSE IT
IS EQUAL BETWEEN THE TWO, YOUR
HONORS, AGAIN -- IT IS A
REASONABLE INFERENCE.
LET'S PUT IT THAT WAY.
IT'S A REASONABLE INFERENCE AND
BECAUSE IT IS A REASONABLE
INFERENCE, YOUR HONORS CANNOT
SAY THERE'S ONLY ONE INFERENCE
PROVED THERE AND THAT'SY
UNINTENTIONAL MURDER WAS A
CORRECT CONVICTION HERE.
WE'RE NOT COMING HERE SAYING E
HAD DIDN'T DO THIS AND HE'S
TOTALLY INNOCENT.
WE'RE COMING TO YOUR HONORS WITH
A REASONABLE ASK HERE AND
REASONABLE REQUEST FOR COUNT
THREE TO BE CONVICTED AND
UNINTENTIONAL CHARGE AND NOT THE
COUNT ONE, COUNT TWO WHICH WERE
THE FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE
MURDER CHARGES.
ARE THERE ANY OTHER QUESTIONS
FROM THE COURT?
THANK YOU, YOUR HONORS.
>> WE'LL SEE YOU IN REBUTTAL.
>> >> GOOD GOOD MORNING.
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT THEY
REPRESENT THE RESPONDENT STATE
OF MINNESOTA.
CHRISTOPHER COLGROVE USED
METHAMPHETAMINE ON SEPTEMBER 27,
2020, BUT HE DEMONSTRATED
THROUGHOUT THAT DAY AND NIGHT HE
WAS CAMEABLE OF MAKING --
CAPABLE OF MAKING DELIBERATE
DECISIONS AND ACTIONS THAT LED
TO THE DEATH OF DAWN SWENSON.
HE CALLED 911 FOR HELP BUT
DIDN'T COOPERATE WITH A POLICE
OFFICER AND EMT THAT RESPONDED.
WHEN COLGROVE BECAME AWARE THAT
THE OFFICER'S TASER SHUT DOWN,
HE JUMPED TO HIS FEET AND PULLED
HIS SISTER BETWEEN HIM AND AN
ARMED OFFICER AND RAN ABOUT ONE
QUARTER OF A MILE TO THE HOME OF
DAWN SWENSON AND COULD HAVE GONE
INTO ONE OF THE OTOSCOPY OUTBUIT
DECIDED TO GO INSIDE THE HOME
GAMES AND THERE'S A STRONG
INFERENCE THAT HE LOCKED THE
DOOR BEHIND HIM.
COLGROVE DECIDED TO ARM HIMSELF
WITH A KNIFE.
MS. SWENSON TOLD COLGROVE TO GET
OUT OF HER HOME AND NOT HURT HER
BUT HE DIDN'T BELIEVE.
THE OFFICER TOLD COLGROVE TO
STOP PHYSICALLY STRUGGLING WITH
MS. SWENSON BUT COLGROVE DID NOT
STOP.
AFTER THE OFFICER TASED HIM AND
MS. SWENSON PUSHED HIM AWAY,
COLGROVE COULD HAVE DROPPED THE
KNIFE AND RAN OUT OF THE HOUSE.
INSTEAD HE RAISED HIS ARM AND
STABBED MS. SWENSON ONCE AND
THEN A SECOND TIME.
THE STAB WOUNDS TO MS. SWENSON'S
NECK AND BACK ARE VISIBLE IN
TRIAL EVIDENCE 14 AND 15.
COLGROVE FLED AND HID TILL EARLY
THE NEXT MORNING WHEN HE
RESPONSE RESPONDED TO HIS --
RESPONDED TO HIS FATHER'S CALLS.
THE STATE IS SAYING HE WAS TO
INTOXICATED TO FORM AN INTENT
BUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED ARE
CONSIST ONLY WITH COLGROVE'S
GUILT AND INCONSIST WITH THE
RATIONAL THEORY -- INCONSISTENT
WITH THE RATIONAL THEORY OF
RATIONAL GUILT.
COLGROVE'S GUILTY TESTIFIED THEY
WERE METH USERS AND USED ON
SEPTEMBER 7.
SHE TESTIFIED THAT COLGROVE TOOK
A MUSCLE RELAX SORE AND MEL
TONEN.
THERE'S NO EVIDENCE HE USED METH
BETWEEN 2:00 P.M. AND 8:30 P.M.
WHEN COLGROVE CALLED 911.
THE COLGROVE SAID HIS EVIDENCE
OF INTOXICATION WAS STRONGER
THAN IT WAS IN STATE VERSUS
ERICKSON AND STATE VERSUS HALE.
COLGROVE USED COCAINE, SMOKED
MARIJUANA.
ERICKSON DRANK A LARGE AMOUNT OF
BILL, CONSUME ADD STIMULANT AND
SMOKED MARIJUANA.
THE THIRD WAS COCAINE,
TRANQUILIZER AND WHISKEY.
THERE'S NO EVIDENCE THAT
COLGROVE SMOKED MARIJUANA OR
CONSUMED ALCOHOL OR USED COCAINE
ON SEPTEMBER 7.
>> COUNSEL, I WANT TO STOP YOU
AND SEE IF MEMBERS OF THE COURT
HAVE QUESTIONS FOR YOU.
I GUESS I'LL START.
>> IS THE EVIDENCE THAT IS NOT
CONSIST WITH CONTENT CASE?
>> YOUR HONOR, ASKING ABOUT THE
CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED IN OKAY.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED THAT
COLGROVE WAS ACTING WITH INTENT
AND PURPOSE.
AND AT LEAST TWO AREAS THAT
ILLUSTRATE THAT HE WAS ACTING
WITH INTENT AND PURPOSE ARE THE
911 CALL AND HAD A CONVERSATION
WITH THE 911 DISPATCHER,
IDENTIFIED HIMSELF, CORRECTED
THE DISPATCHER, PROVIDED
INFORMATION ABOUT HIS ADDRESS
AND IN ADDITION --
>> I GUESS I DON'T DISAGREE WITH
YOU THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES
PROVED SUPPORT THE REASONABLE
HYPOTHESIS HE ACTED WITH INTENT
TO KILL.
THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED LEAVE OPEN
ANOTHER REASONABLE HYPOTHESIS
AND THAT'S THAT HE JUST INTENDED
TO ASSAULT HER, NOT KILL HER.
>> THAT DO NOT LEAVE OPEN THAT
HYPOTHESIS, YOUR HONOR.
THIS IS A CASE WHERE
MR. COLGROVE WENT INTO A
NEIGHBOR'S HOME THAT HE WAS NOT
FAMILIAR WITH, ENGAGED IN A
STRUGGLE WITH HER AND REJECTED
AT LEAST TWO OPPORTUNITIES TO
LEAVE THE HOME AND FOUGHT WITH
HER AND THEN STABBED HER NOT
ONCE BUT TWICE AND THE STAB
WOUNDS WERE BOTH OF THEM WERE
SERIOUS, ONE WAS MORE SERIOUS
THAN THE OTHER, PENETRATED FIVE
INCHES AND SEVERAL ORGANS AND
CAUSED MS. SWENSON'S DEATH.
>> WHAT WAS THE EVIDENCE HE HAD
TWO CHANCES TO LEAVE?
>> WELL, WHEN OFFICER OLSON
ARRIVES AT THE HOME, HE
OVERHEARS -- OR HE CAN HEAR
COMING FROM THE HOME THE SOUND
OF MS. SWINSON TELLING COLGROVE
TO LEAVE, GET OUT OF MY HOUSE
AND DON'T HURT ME.
SO THERE WAS CLEARLY -- THAT WAS
A OPPORTUNITY THERE FOR
MR. COLGROVE TO LEAVE THE HOME.
HE'S BEING TOLD --
>> HOW DOES THAT PROVE INTENT --
NOT INTENT TO KILL.
HOW DOES THAT PROVE INTENT TO
ASSAULT IS NOT REASONABLE?
>> WELL, IT PROVES THAT THE
INTENT TO ASSAULT IS NOT
REASONABLE BECAUSE HE HAD ARMED
HIMSELF WITH A KNIFE FROM THE
KITCHEN.
>> CAN'T YOU ASSAULT SOMEONE
WITH A KNIFE?
>> YOU CAN ASSAULT MINNESOTA
WITH A KNIFE -- SOMEONE WITH A
KNIFE BUT CLEARLY IT'S A
DANGEROUS WEAPON AND HE
ASSAULTED HER NOT ONCE.
HE DIDN'T MERELY BRANDISH THE
KNIFE.
HE ENGAGED HER IN A PHYSICAL
STRUGGLE WHILE HE HELD THE KNIFE
IN HIS RIGHT HAND.
>> COUNSEL, CAN YOU MAYBE CLEAR
UP WHAT THE STATE'S POSITION IS
ABOUT WHAT THE UN-CONTINUEVERTEE
CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED ARE.
THERE WAS A DISCUSSION WITH
JUSTICE THISSEN AND MS. WORKMAN
ABOUT THE STATE'S POSITION ON.
THAT WHAT I'M GETTING AT IN
PARTICULAR IS WHAT IS THE
STATE'S POSITION ABOUT ALL OF
THE EVIDENCE FROM THE HOST OF
WITNESSES AND SOUNDS LIKE MANY
OF WHICH WERE FROM THE STATE
THAT TALKED ABOUT MR. COLGROVE'S
INTOXICATION?
WHAT IS YOUR -- FROM THE SISTER
AND ALL OF THOSE FOLKS.
>> WELL, THE STATE'S POSITION IS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED IN THE
RESPONDENTS BRIEF ARE THE
CORRECT CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED AND
THE CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED ARE
THOSE THAT ARE CONSIST WITH THE
JURY'S VERDICT.
THE JURY WAS PROVIDED WITH
INFORMATION ON CROSS-EXAMINATION
FROM THE GIRLFRIEND MS. HANSON
ABOUT HIS CONDUCT AND THEY
REJECTED THAT EVIDENCE AND WE
KNOW THAT THEY REJECT THAT HAD
EVIDENCE BECAUSE THEY FOUND
MR. COLGROVE GUILTY AND CAPABLE
OF OF COMMITTING THESE OFFENSES.
MOREOVER THERE WAS EVIDENCE IN
THE RECORD THAT M. COLGROVE WAS
CAMEABLE OF ACTING WITH PURPOSE
AND WITH INTENT.
>> I CAN PROVIDE SOME EXAMPLES
>> THE REAL QUESTION IS MY
READING OF YOUR BRIEF WAS THAT
NONE OF THE EVIDENCE OF OFFICER
OLSON TALKING ABOUT THE FACT
THAT COLGROVE DIDN'T RECOGNIZE
THAT HE WAS A REAL OFFICER AND
THOUGHT HE WAS A FAKE OFFICER.
THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE EMT
TESTIFIED SHE THOUGHT COLGROVE
DIDN'T RECOGNIZE SHE WAS A REAL
EMT AND THE TESTIMONY OF BEING
CONSIST AND HAD TO SLAP HIM.
MY READING IS THE STATE WAS
SAYING THOSE ARE NOT IN THE
BUCKET OF CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED.
IS THAT THE STATE'S POSITION?
>> I WOULD GENERALLY AGREE WITH
THAT THAT THE EVIDENCE THAT'S IN
CONSIST WITH THE JURY'S FINDING
THAT MR. COLGROVE WAS CAPABLE OF
NOT BEING TOO INTOXICATED TO
FORM INTENT ARE DIFFERENT FROM
THE CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED.
>> COUNSEL, DOESN'T AL NASSIR
SUGGEST THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO
CONSIDER THOSE BECAUSE THOSE
FACTS -- THAT INFORMATION IS
UNCONTRADICTED IN THE RECORD AND
SO IT DOES SEEM LIKE AL NASSIR
SAYS THAT GOES INTO THE BUCKET
OF CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED.
>> YOUR HONOR, EVEN CASSIOPPI
CEMENTING THAT, LET'S -- I'LL
ACCEPT THAT ARGUMENT.
THERE'S STILL EVIDENCE IN THE
RECORD THAT MR. COLGROVE WAS
CAPABLE OF ACTING IN A
DELIBERATE AND PURPOSESFUL WAY.
HE WAS NOT --
>> THAT SORT OF GOES BACK TO THE
HEART AND CHIEF JUSTICE AND THAT
MAY BE TRUE BUT ISN'T IT CONSIST
WITH INTENT TO SIMPLY ASSAULT?
IT'S BOTH.
COULDN'T IT BE BOTH?
>> WELL, YOUR HONOR, THE
DIFFERENCE -- INTENT TO ASSAULT,
TWO STAB WOUNDS, TWO DEEP STAB
WOUNDS, ONE STAB WOUND THAT BEN
TRAITS FIVE INCHES AND PIERCES
FIVE ORGANS, THAT'S NOT CONSIST
WITH ASSAULT.
THAT'S ONLY CONSIST WITH INTENT
TO MURDER, ESPECIALLY UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES AT LARGE HERE
WHERE MR. COLGROVE GOES INTO THE
HOME, UNINVITED AND EVIDENCE IS
THAT HE SIMPLY WALKED INTO THE
HOME AND THE FAMILY KEPT THE
DOORS UNLOCKED TILL BEDTIME AND
THERE'S EVIDENCE THAT HE LOCKED
THE DOOR BEHIND HIM AND ARMED
HIMSELF WITH A KNIFE.
AGAIN, DECLINED -- REFUSED TO
LEAVE THE HOME >> THAT'S ALWAYS
CONSIST WITH A SYRINGE -- INDIVL
THAT'S SO HIGH AND HE'S SCARED
AND ANGRY WITH THE "FAKE
COP" WHO'S TASED HIM.
IT'S CONSIST WITH THAT FRAME OF
MIND AS WELL.
>> WELL, YOUR HONOR, YOU KNOW,
AGAIN, IN THE INTRODUCTION, I
TALKED ABOUT THE EVIDENCE OF THE
METHAMPHETAMINE USE AND MOST OF
THE EVIDENCE OF THE
METHAMPHETAMINE USE AT TRIAL
CAME IN THROUGH THE GIRLFRIEND,
MS. HANSON.
MS. HANSON ALSO WAS USING
METHAMPHETAMINE AND ADMITTED SHE
AND METHAMPHETAMINE USERS AND
THAT WASN'T A DENIAL.
THERE'S QUESTIONS ON
MR. COLGROVE'S CONDUCT AND HER
DESCRIPTION OF MR. COLGROVE'S
CONDUCT IS BEING PROVIDED TO THE
JURY THROUGH SOMEONE ELSE WHO
WAS USING METHAMPHETAMINE AT THE
TIME.
>> BUT YOU HAVE THE TESTIMONY OF
THE POLICE OFFICER AND EMT AND
THEY BOTH MAKE IT CLEAR THAT MRA
RATIONAL WAY.
>> HIS BEHAVIOR WAS INCONSIST
AND AT TIMES HE COOPERATED WITH
THE EMT AND AT TIMES COOPERATED
WITH THE OFFICER.
HE INITIALLY DID NOT BELIEVE
THAT THE EMT WAS WHO THEY SAID
THEY WERE.
AT ONE TIME THEY OPENED THE DOOR
AND ASKED FOR HELP.
THAT EVINCES SOME BELIEF SHE
COULD PROVIDE HELP AND SOME
BELIEF THAT HE DID ACCEPT HER AS
AN EMT.
WITH THE OFFICER, HE ACCEPTS THE
OFFICER'S AUTHORITY AND REQUESTS
DIRECTIONS TO AN EXTENT, BUT
ALSO REJECTS THE OFFICER'S SHOW
OF AUTHORITY OR EFFORTS IT
ASSIST MR. COLGROVE.
SO IT'S MIXED AT THAT POINT BUT
WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT WHEN THE
TASER MALFUNCTIONS, HE DOES
SOMETHING VERY DELIBERATE, HE
GETS UP TO HIS FEET, HE GRABS
HIS SISTER AND USES HER AS A
SHIELD.
THEN HE RUNS OFF.
I'D ALSO LIKE TO -- WELL, I'LL
JUST LEAVE IT AT THAT, YOUR
HONOR.
>> I WANT TO ASK YOU ABOUT THE
STANDARD FOR VOLUNTARY
INTOXICATION.
AM I RIGHT THAT MR. COLGROVE
MUST PROVE HE WAS SO INTOXICATE
THAT HAD HE -- INTOXICATED THAT
HE COULD NOT FORM THE INTENT TO
KILL A HUMAN BEING?
IS THAT THE STATEMENT?
>> I'M NOT SURE IF THAT'S THE
CORRECT STATEMENT.
IN THIS CASE, THIS IS BEING
CHALLENGED AS A SUFFICIENCY
ARGUMENT THAT THE EVIDENCE OF
HIS INTENT WAS INSUFFICIENT
BECAUSE HE WAS TOO INTOXICATED
TO FORM THE INTENT SO IT BECAME
AT TRIAL ONE OF THE FACTS AMONG
MANY THAT THE JURY WAS FREE TO
ACCEPT OR REJECT.
THE STANDARD THAT YOU POINTED TO
THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO KNOW THAT
HE WAS STABBING --
>> THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE AN
INTENT TO STAB A HUMAN BEING.
DOESN'T MATTER WHO THE HUMAN
BEING IS, BUT --
>> I DID NOT ENCOUNTER THAT
STATEMENT IN ANY OF THE CASES
THAT I READ, YOUR HONOR.
>> SO WHAT WOULD PREVAIL AS A --
WHAT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO
PROVE VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION TO
UNDERMINE THE ABILITY TO FORM
INTEND?
>> YOUR HONOR, I DIDN'T --
>> HOW DO WE KNOW THAT?
HOW DO YOU KNOW THAT?
HOW DOES THE JURY KNOW THAT MOST
IMPORTANTLY I SUPPOSE?
>> WELL, THAT'S A GOOD QUESTION
BECAUSE I DID NOT ENCOUNTER ANY
CASES WHERE THE COURT HAS FOUND
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
SUFFICIENT TO REVERSE ON APPEAL,
AND APPELLANT HASN'T CITED TO
ANY.
>> IS IT LIKE A MENTAL
IMPAIRMENT THAT IS SO STRONG
THAT THE -- I MEAN, IS THAT THE
RIGHT ANALOGY HERE?
>> I DON'T THINK IT'S A CORRECT
ANALOGY BECAUSE VOLUNTARY
INTOXICATION --
>> SO IT HAS TO BE MORE SERIOUS
THAN A MENTAL IMPAIRMENT?
>> BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY DEFINES
A VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION AS
QUALITY, STATE, OR CONDITION OF
HAVING WILLINGLY INGESTED
ALCOHOL OR DRUGS TO THE POINT OF
IMPAIRMENT.
DONE WITH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT
ONCE PHYSICAL AND MENTAL
CAPABILITIES WOULD BE IMPAIRED.
>> OKAY.
IN ACCEPTING THAT DEFINITION,
WHEN DOES THAT -- HOW DO OWE
KNOW WHEN THE LEVEL OF
IMPAIRMENT IS SO HIGH THAT
SOMEONE CAN'T -- OR SO SEVERE
THAT SOMEONE CAN'T FORM AN
INTENT?
YOU SEEM TO BE SUGGESTING THAT
HE'S GOING BACK AND OUT AND
SOMETIMES HE ACTS RATIONALLY AND
SOMETIMES HE DOESN'T.
WHAT IS -- IT SEEMS -- YOU GOT
TO TIE THAT IN WITH THE CRIME;
RIGHT?
>> WELL, YOUR HONOR, WE KNOW
IT'S NOT PRESENT HERE BECAUSE
THERE IS NO -- THERE IS NO WAY
TO MEASURE WHATEVER HIS
INTOXICATION LEVEL WAS, IT WAS
NOT -- THERE'S NOTHING IN THIS
CASE TO MEASURE IT.
THERE IS SOME TESTIMONY BY MS.
MS. HANSON, THE GIRLFRIEND OF
HIS CONDUCT AND LEADING UP TO
THE CONDUCT ON SEPTEMBER 7 AND
ALICIA COLGROVE, THE SISTER, WAS
NOT AT THE COLGROVE HOME FOR
MOST OF SEPTEMBER 7.
SHE STOPPED IN AROUND 3:00 P.M.
AND THEN SHE STOPPED BACK AGAIN
AT THE HOUSE ABOUT 8:30 P.M..
SO HER --
>> YOUR ARGUMENT IS THAT HE
WASN'T EVEN -- THERE'S NOT EVEN
PROOF HE WAS INTOXICATED?
>> I THINK THAT WOULD BE A
REASONABLE INFERENCE --
>> YOU'RE MAKING THAT
DISTINCTION?
>> WELL, THE DIGGS TINCTION
IS -- DISTINCTION IS IT'S REALLY
UNCLEAR.
WE KNOW HE CONSUMED
METHAMPHETAMINE ON SEPTEMBER 7.
WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE EVIDENCE
SHOWS THERE'S NO EVIDENCE THAT
HE CONSUMED METH BETWEEN
2:00 P.M. AND THAT'S THE TIME
THAT MS. HANSEN LEFT THE HOME
AND 8:30 P.M..
THERE'S NO WAY -- THERE'S SIMPLY
NO WAY TO KNOW --
>> LET'S ASSUME THERE'S EVIDENCE
HE CONSUMED METH THIS WHOLE
TIME.
HOW DO WE KNOW, I'M ASKING FOR
THE STATE'S POSITION JUST TO
KIND OF HAVE A GENERAL
PRINCIPLE, HOW DO WE KNOW WHEN
SOMEONE IS SO IMPAIRED BECAUSE
OF VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
BECAUSE THEY TOOK A DRUG
THEMSELVES THAT THEY CAN'T FORM
AN INTENT?
WHAT'S THE TEST FOR THAT?
THAT'S THE MOMENTUM AND THERE'S
A TEST FOR PSYCHOLOGIST I
SUPPOSE CAN DO TESTING AND THAT
KIND OF STUFF.
THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE.
WHAT IS THE TEST?
WHAT DOES IT MEAN YOU CAN'T FORM
AN INTENT?
>> WELL, THERE'S NOT -- THERE IS
NOT A FIRM TEST THAT EVIDENCE OF
INFECTIONTHAT I CAMEACROSS IN T-
>> AND THAT MAY BE OKAY.
>> EXCUSE ME.
I'M JUST LOOKING AT SOME NOTES
HERE.
>> I DIDN'T FIND ANY EITHER AND
THAT'S WHY I'M ASKING YOU THE
QUESTION.
>> I GUESS THERE'S SOME HELPFUL
LANGUAGE IN SOME OF THE CASES
AND LOOK AT THE CONDUCT IN
SEVERAL OF THE CASES, TORRES,
WALLBURG, ERICKSON I FOUND
HELPFUL.
THERE'S SEVERAL CASES WHERE THE
COURT ADDRESSES THE EVIDENCE OF
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION AND THREE
ARE ERICKSON, WALLBURG, AND
HALE.
IN THE CASES DISCUSS OR NOTE
THAT MINNESOTA LAW AND YOU'RE
FAMILIAR WITH THIS AND THE
FAMILIARITY OF THIS WHERE THE
DEFENDANT CANNOT FORM THE
INTENT, CANNOT ACT WITH INTENT.
THE FOCUS IS IN WALLBURG,
ERICKSON, AND HALE THAT IF
THERE'S EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
THAT SUPPORTS THE JURY
DETERMINATION BUT IF THERE'S
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT
CONTRADICTS THE EVIDENCE OF
INTOXICATION THEN THE JURY'S
VERDICT OF GUILT WILL BE UPHELD
AND THAT CERTAINLY APPLIES HERE.
THERE'S A LOT OF EVIDENCE IN
THIS CASE OF MR. COLGROVE ACTING
IN A DELIBERATE AND EVEN
THOUGHTFUL AMERICAN, AND THAT
CONTRADICTS ANY -- MANNER AND
THAT CONTRADICTS ANY EVIDENCE OF
INTOXICATED EVIDENCE.
>> ON THE QUESTION OF -- WHAT DO
WE -- SO OUR WHOLE JOB ON THIS
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS NOT
GIVE ANY UNDERSTAND FENCER TO
THAT AND THERE'S NO -- INFERENCE
AND THE INTENT TO KILL AND
THAT'S WHAT WE'RE TRYING TO
ASSESS AND IF THE TEST IS
EVERYTHING INCONSISTENT WITH THE
VERDICT AND THE VERDICT IS BASED
ON AN INFERENCE OF SPECIFIC
INTENT, HOW DO WE RESOLVE THAT
INTENTION BECAUSE WE CAN'T
ASSUME SPECIFIC INTENT BECAUSE
THE WHOLE POINT IS NOT TO DO
THAT.
HOW DO WE APPLY THIS TEST?
>> DIFFICULT OR CHALLENGING IN
THE VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION TEST.
>> THAT'S A DIFFERENT CASE.
LET'S TALK ABOUT JUST INTENT TO
KILL IN THAT CON THEQUE, HOW DO
WE MAKE THE DISTINCTION?
>> ONE OF THE DISTINCTIONS IS --
I MEAN, IT'S THE NATURE.
IF YOU LOOK AT FACTS OF WHAT
HAPPENED THE DEFENDANT'S SAMES
AND CONDUCT BEFORE, DURING AND
AFTER, THOSE ARE ALL IMPORTANT
PIECES OF THE PUZZLE THAT --
>> LIKE AFTER HE FLED AND HID?
>> HE FLED AND HE HID --
>> WOULDN'T SOMEONE THAT
ASSAULTED SOMEONE WITH GREAT
BODILY HARM FLEE AND HIDE?
>> I THINK THE CONDUCT, I THINK
IN THIS CASE THE CONDUCT THAT'S
TAKEN SPECIFICALLY, ONCE
MR. COLGROVE FLEES, LEAVES THE
COLGROVE PROPERTY, HE RUNS IT'S
NOT CLEAR HOW LONG IT'S BEEN FOR
A PERIOD OF TIME BUT RE-CLEARLY
MADE A DECISION TO GO INTO THAT
HOUSE.
HE HAD A DANGEROUS KNIFE.
>> EVEN TO THIS POINT AT THE END
OF THE STRUGGLE WITH THE
PRESENCE OF A POLICE OFFICERS
AND HE COULDN'T HAVE DROPPED THE
KNIFE AND RUN OUT THE DOOR, HE
MADE A CHOICE.
TO STAB MS. SWINSON NOT ONCE BUT
TWICE.
THAT'S SIGNIFICANT AND NOT
MERELY BRANDISHING THE KNIFE
AGAINST MS. SWINSON OR THE
OFFICER OR THREATENING, IT WAS
AN ACTUAL STABBING.
THAT TELLS YOU A LOT ABOUT WHAT
TO KNOW AND INTENT TO KILL DAWN
SWINSON VERSUS FREQUENCIES IS AN
INTENT TO ASSAULT.
LOOKS LIKE NO MORE QUESTIONS.
THE STATE WOULD RESPECTFULLY ASK
THIS COURT TO AFFIRM THE
CONVICTIONS.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
>> THANK YOU, COUNSEL.
>> MS. WORKMAN, YOU HAVE FIVE
MINUTES FOR REBUTTAL.
>> YOUR HONORS, I WANT TO
CORRECT A FACTITIAL STATEMENT
MADE BY COUNSEL AND SAID THERE'S
NO EVIDENCE OF METH USAGE FROM
2:00 TO 8:00, AND I'LL JUST
REMIND THE COURT THAT THE SISTER
TESTIFIED THAT WHEN SHE RETURNED
TO THE HOUSE AFTER 8:00, SHE
FOUND A NEEDLE CAP IN THE TOILET
AND SHE KNEW IT WAS MY CLIENT'S.
I WILL SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT
IT'S UNLIKELY THAT THAT NEEDLE
CAP SAT IN THERE FOR OVER EIGHT
HOURS AND IT'S MORE LIKELY
THAT'S INDICATIVE OF RECENT
USAGE.
NOW, YOUR HONORS AND
PARTICULARLY YOU, JUSTICE
THISSEN WERE TALKING ABOUT HOW
DO WE APPLY THE VOLUNTARY
INTOXICATION STANDARD HERE AND
WHAT DOES IT MEAN AND WHAT ARE
WE SUPPOSED TO DO HERE?
I WANT TO BE CLEAR THAT WE
SHOULD NOT VEER INTO MY MA MCNON
STANDARD AND VOLUNTARY VOX
INDICATION IS DIFFERENT AND NOT
WELL DEFINED FROM CASE LAW AND
THAT'S PERHAPS BECAUSE THE COURT
HAS NOT FOUND VOLUNTARY
INTOXICATION TO NEGATE SPECIFIC
INTENT BEFORE BUT THIS COURT HAS
NOT BEEN FACED WITH SUCH
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF
INTOXICATION AS IT HAS HERE.
>> COUNSEL, I WANTED TO ASK YOU
ABOUT THE MERLE CASE.
WHERE ONE STAB WOUND TO THE
HEART SHOWED INTENT TO KILL.
HOW DID YOU DISTINGUISH THAT
CASE FROM THIS?
>> I DON'T BELIEVE IT WAS A
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION ARGUMENT.
>> I DON'T BELIEVE SO BUT GOING
TO THE KEY ISSUE HERE OF --
WELL, I MEAN, THERE ARE TWO KEY
ISSUES WHETHER THAT WAS AN
INTENT AND IF THERE WAS INTENT
THEN IS IT TO KILL OR ASSAULT.
IN MERLE, THERE WAS JUST ONE --
THERE WERE NO OTHER STAB WOUNDS
AND PROBABLY MORE EVIDENCE ABOUT
MOTIVE AND THAT KIND OF THING.
>> WE HAVE TO REMEMBER THIS IS
THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WE'RE LOOKING
AT.
I JUST WANT TO ALSO BE CLEAR
THAT IT SEEPS THAT THE STATE IS
REALLY TRYING TO DISTANCE
THEMSELVES FROM ALL OF THE
INTOXICATION EVIDENCE HERE.
NOT ONLY IS THIS THEIR OWN
EVIDENCE, IT IS COPIOUS
THROUGHOUT THE RECORD AND IF YOU
DISTANCE YOURSELVES AND SAY THAT
THIS SUN PROVED AND NOT A
CIRCUMSTANCE PROVED HERE, WHAT
WAS PROVED?
THERE'S HARDLY ANY EVIDENCE
BEFORE YOU THEN.
WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH --
>> WHAT WAS PROVED IS THAT HE
STABBED THIS PERSON.
>> WHAT WAS PROVE PROVED IS SHE.
>> WHAT WAS PROVED SHE STABBED
TWICE, IN THE NECK AND BACK,
2 INCHES IN THE NECK AND FIVE
INCHES IN THE BACK HITTING FOUR
ORGANS AND THOSE ARE FACTS
PROVED AND YOU'D ACKNOWLEDGE AT
THE VERY LEAST THAT WOULD
SUPPORT.
I THINK YOU'VE SAID THAT WOULD
SUPPORT A SPECIFIC INTENT TO
KILL.
THE REAL QUESTION IS WOULD IT
SUPPORT SOMETHING ELSE AND MAYBE
WHY MERLE IS DIFFERENT BUT ONE
MIGHT AND COULD ALSO NOT.
>> THAT'S RIGHT AND --
>> YOU CAN'T DENY THERE'S FACTS
PROVED INTENT TO KILL.
>> IT'S THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WE HAVE TO
LOOK AT HERE AND AGAIN THIS IS
IDENTIFY THROUGHOUT THE CASE AND
CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED AND
SOMEBODY WITH THE INTENT
FOR ASSAULT.
>> COUNSEL, YOUR OPPONENT MADE A
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT IF
THERE'S EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
THAT CONTRADICTS INTOXICATION,
WE'RE REQUIRED TO UPHOLD THE
VERDICT HERE.
WHERE DO YOU PUT THAT STATEMENT?
>> I THINK THAT'S THE STATE
TRYING TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES
FROM THE INTOXICATION EVIDENCE
HERE.
I WOULD AGREE THAT IF THERE'S
CONTRADICTED EVIDENCE THAT YOU
DO HAVE TO GO WITH THE EVIDENCE
THAT ARE REJECTED AND WE'RE NOT
IN THE SITUATION HERE AND IT IS
EQUALLY LIKELY THAT THE JURY
THOUGHT HE WAS INTOXICATED AND
IN THAT MOMENT THOUGHT HE COULD
FORM INTENT.
IT'S NOT THAT THEY REJECTED
INTOXICATION HERE, IT'S MAYBE
THEY THOUGHT HE WAS LUCID AT
THAT MOMENT BUT OUR POINT IS
THAT THE STATE'S EVIDENCE
DOESN'T PROVE THAT HE KNEW WHAT
WAS GOING ON AND HE COULD FORM
INTENT AT THAT POINT.
THAT'S REALLY WHERE THE NUTS AND
BOLTS COME DOWN TO IN THIS CASE.
THANK YOU, YOUR HONORS.
>> THANK YOU, COUNSEL.
THANK YOU TO BOTH COUNSELS FOR
THE HELP YOU PROVIDED IN THIS
CASE.
THE MATTER IS SUBMITTED IN DUE
COURT.
WE'RE IN RECESS.